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| author | Lukas Fleischer <cgit@cryptocrack.de> | 2011-07-22 13:47:19 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Lars Hjemli <hjemli@gmail.com> | 2011-07-22 12:21:28 +0000 |
| commit | bebe89d7c11a92bf206bf6e528c51ffa8ecbc0d5 (patch) | |
| tree | 33e28db20cbae2aa513ccec38c7d4706654eed46 | |
| parent | Remove dead initialization in cgit_parse_commit() (diff) | |
| download | cgit-pink-bebe89d7c11a92bf206bf6e528c51ffa8ecbc0d5.tar.gz cgit-pink-bebe89d7c11a92bf206bf6e528c51ffa8ecbc0d5.zip | |
Fix potential XSS vulnerability in rename hint
The file name displayed in the rename hint should be escaped to avoid XSS. Note that this vulnerability is only applicable when an attacker has gained push access to the repository. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <cgit@cryptocrack.de> Signed-off-by: Lars Hjemli <hjemli@gmail.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | ui-diff.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/ui-diff.c b/ui-diff.c index d21541b..383a534 100644 --- a/ui-diff.c +++ b/ui-diff.c @@ -97,10 +97,12 @@ static void print_fileinfo(struct fileinfo *info) htmlf("</td><td class='%s'>", class); cgit_diff_link(info->new_path, NULL, NULL, ctx.qry.head, ctx.qry.sha1, ctx.qry.sha2, info->new_path, 0); - if (info->status == DIFF_STATUS_COPIED || info->status == DIFF_STATUS_RENAMED) - htmlf(" (%s from %s)", - info->status == DIFF_STATUS_COPIED ? "copied" : "renamed", - info->old_path); + if (info->status == DIFF_STATUS_COPIED || info->status == DIFF_STATUS_RENAMED) { + htmlf(" (%s from ", + info->status == DIFF_STATUS_COPIED ? "copied" : "renamed"); + html_txt(info->old_path); + html(")"); + } html("</td><td class='right'>"); if (info->binary) { htmlf("bin</td><td class='graph'>%ld -> %ld bytes", |