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authorJune McEnroe <june@causal.agency>2020-11-16 18:46:15 -0500
committerJune McEnroe <june@causal.agency>2020-11-16 18:46:15 -0500
commiteea44a8ad89a7c3ee2c8647e21c007b5250b4fb9 (patch)
tree332de89d092a4b64e01c250443715d6f66b5fde0
parentSet client sockets non-blocking (diff)
downloadpounce-eea44a8ad89a7c3ee2c8647e21c007b5250b4fb9.tar.gz
pounce-eea44a8ad89a7c3ee2c8647e21c007b5250b4fb9.zip
Only allow clients to AUTHENTICATE if using a cert
Otherwise the successful authentication message can leak information to
unauthenticated clients when both certificate and password
authentication are enabled.
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--client.c5
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/client.c b/client.c
index 6c12405..ea28d82 100644
--- a/client.c
+++ b/client.c
@@ -232,9 +232,10 @@ static void handleCap(struct Client *client, struct Message *msg) {
 
 static void handleAuthenticate(struct Client *client, struct Message *msg) {
 	if (!msg->params[0]) msg->params[0] = "";
-	if (!strcmp(msg->params[0], "EXTERNAL")) {
+	bool cert = (clientCaps & CapSASL) && tls_peer_cert_provided(client->tls);
+	if (cert && !strcmp(msg->params[0], "EXTERNAL")) {
 		clientFormat(client, "AUTHENTICATE +\r\n");
-	} else if (!strcmp(msg->params[0], "+")) {
+	} else if (cert && !strcmp(msg->params[0], "+")) {
 		clientFormat(
 			client, ":%s 900 * %s * :You are now logged in as *\r\n",
 			ORIGIN, stateEcho()